







Seeing With Three Eyes
Ibn al-ʽArabī’s barzakh and the Contemporary World Situation
Abstract
The author of this paper attempts to write about the mystery of the barzakh in and from Ibn 
al-ʽArabī’s perspective. Ibn al-ʽArabī’s perspective observes things from three dimensions: 
the two dimensions of the positive and negative, which are familiar to us by means of our 
ordinary binary perception, and in addition the third dimension that belongs neither to the 
one, nor to the other. This is the dimension of the barzakh, which can be called tertiary, since 
it is unitive and inclusive of the two familiar dimensions. “Seeing” the third dimension of 
the barzakh is not accessible to ordinary binary perception; it is accessible, according to 
Ibn al-ʽArabī, only to those who possess a special kind of seeing; they are the ahl	al-kashf, 
those who “see” with three eyes, as it were. Nevertheless, between the binary and the terti-
ary/unitive perceptions there is a pervasive tension of relatedness. It is a dynamic tension 
that makes its mark on all levels of existence, whether consciously or unconsciously. In 
other words, although the barzakh belongs to the dimension of the mysterious “third”, it 
is powerfully present and influential all around. It manifests itself as the cognitive func-
tion that Ibn al-ʽArabī calls ‘imagination’ (al-khayāl). For him, the barzakh-imagination is 
the most powerful cognitive function in the human makeup, and it hinges on a paradox: it 
makes everything that it conceives an “it/not it”. God, too, from this perspective, is “He/not 
He”. Following from the cognitive field that evolves from the tertiary-barzakh-imaginative 
perspective, I consider the notion coincidentia	oppositorum (‘the union of the opposites’, al-
jamʽ	bayna	al-ḍiddayn). Finally, I apply the insights stemming from Ibn al-ʽArabī’s perspec-
tive to the question of ‘identities’ and to the ethical dilemmas of our contemporary world.
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but	 from	al-Khaḍir	 (=	al-Khiḍr),	 the	undying	 teacher	of	 those	who	do	not	
have	a	flesh-and-blood	one.2	In	1200,	already	widely	known	as	a	stimulating	
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on	his	huge	opus,	The Meccan Revelations	(al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya).	This,	





view	of	 the	 formidable	 corpus	 of	 Ibn	 al-ʽArabī’s	works,4	 and	 the	 daunting	



























ing	on	IA,	either	 in	general	or	on	any	specific	 theme.	Well,	 there	 is	an	an-
swer	and	it	is	simple:	his	writing	is	magnetically	captivating	and	his	visionary	
perspective	alluring;	not	unlike	a	detective’s	obsession	with	deciphering	the	























Meccan Revelations (=	al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya),	he	writes:
“The	‘middle’,	that	which	separates	between	two	sides	and	makes	them	distinguished	from	one	
another,	 is	more	hidden	 than	 they	are (akhfā minhumā).	For	example,	 the	 line	 that	separates	
between	the	shadow	and	the	sun;	or	the	barrier (barzakh) between the two seas – the sweet one 
and the bitter one;	or	that	which	separates	between	black	and	white.	We	know	that	there	is	a	
separating	line	there,	but	the	eye	does	not	perceive	it;	the	intellect	acknowledges	it,	though	it	
does	not	conceive	of	what	it	is,	namely,	it	does	not	conceive	its	‘whatness’	(quiddity).”9
By	 “the	 two	 seas”	 IA	alludes	 to	 “the	 sweet	 one	 and	 the	bitter	 one”	of	 the	
Qur’ānic	verse	25:53.	The	verse	runs	as	follows:
“And	it	is	He	who	has	released	the	two	seas,	one	fresh	and	sweet	and	one	salty	and	bitter,	and	He	
placed	between	them	a	barrier	(wa-jaʽala baynahumā barzakhan) and	a	prohibiting	partition.”





What	 is,	 and	where	 is,	 this	“hidden”	 line	 that	carries	out	concurrently	 two	
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For	a	comprehensive	and	scholarly	biography	
of	 IA,	 see	Claude	Addas,	Quest for the Red 
Sulphur: The Life of Ibn ʽArabī,	trans.	by	Pe-
ter	Kingsley,	 Cambridge:	The	 Islamic	Texts	
Society,	1993.	See,	also,	Stephen	Hirtenstein,	
The Unlimited Mercifier: The Spiritual Life 
and Thought of Ibn ʽArabī,	Oxford,	Ashland:	
Anqa	Publishing,	White	Cloud	Press,	1999.
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See	 Jane	 Clark,	 Stephen	 Hirtenstein,	 “Esta-
blishing	Ibn	ʽArabī’s	Heritage:	First	Findings	
from	 the	MIAS	Archiving	Project”,	Journal 
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See,	e.g.,	 the	 list	of	articles	on	 the	webpage	




The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-ʽArabi’s 
Metaphysics of Imagination	 (Albany:	 State	
University	of	New	York	Press,	1989)	and	The 




For	 a	 fine	 scholarly	 elaboration	 of	 the	 bar-
zakh,	 see	Salman	H.	Bashier,	Ibn al-ʽArabī’s 
Barzakh: The Concept of the Limit and the 




See,	 e.g.,	 IA’s	 “Introduction”	 in	 the	 first	
volume	 of	 his	 Meccan Revelations;	 Ibn	 al-
ʽArabī,	 Muḥyī	 al-Dīn	 Muḥammad	 ibn	 ʽAlī,	






















min ʽibādinā)	and	to	whom	God	has	given	special	knowledge	(ʽallamnāhu min 


















describes	the	barzakh	in	chapter	63	of The Meccan Revelations:
“Since	 the barzakh is	 something	 that	 separates	 what	 is	 knowable	 and	 what	 is	 unknowable	
(maʽlūm wa-ghayr maʽlūm);	non-existent	(maʽdūm)	and	existent	(mawjūd);	intelligible	and	un-
intelligible	(maʽqūl wa-ghayr maʽqūl);	negated	(manfiyy)	and	affirmed	(muthbat)	–	it	has	been	




















is	 it?	And	 another	 question	 lurks	 in	 the	 vision	 of	 the barzakhi confluence	

















guistic	level, al-jamʽ bayna al-ḍiddayn is	precisely	identical	to	the	Latin	term 
coincidentia	oppositorum. Looked	at	 from	 the	Arabic	 terminology, majmaʽ	
(as	in majmaʽ al-baḥrayn)	shares	the	root j-m-ʽ with jamʽ. Lexically, majmaʽ	
denotes	a	place of	coming	together	and jamʽ the act	of	gathering	and	hold-
ing	diverse	things	together,	as	well	as	the	state that	results	from	such	an	act	
– collectedness,	aggregation,	unity.	In	IA’s	writing, jamʽ	and	its	antonym farq
(separation,	differentiation)	are	cardinal	concepts	upon	which	his	understand-






Islamic	 tradition	 identifies	 this	 person	 with	
Khaḍir/Khiḍr;	 in	 the	 Sufi	 tradition,	 Khiḍr	 is	
the	divine	teacher	of	those	who	do	not	have	a	
flesh-and-blood	one.	For	 a	 discussion	on	 this	
Qur’ānic	story,	see	Sara	Sviri,	The Taste of Hid-













of	 the	core	 themes	 in	 IA’s	worldview,	but	 it	
calls	for	a	separate	discussion.
14
See	 Ibn	 al-ʽArabī,	 Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya,	
Vol.	1,	Ch.	63,	pp.	680–681.
15
See	 Michael	 A.	 Sells,	 Mystical Languages 
of Unsaying,	 Chicago:	University	 of	 Chica-
go	Press,	 1994.	See,	 also,	Michael	A.	Sells,	
“Ibn	 ʽArabi’s	 Polished	 Mirror:	 Perspective	
Shift	 and	Meaning	Event”,	Studia Islamica,	





See,	 e.g.,	 John	 Valk,	 “The	 Concept	 of	 the	
Coincidentia	 Oppositorum	 in	 the	 Thought	




See,	 e.g.,	 the	 poetic	 verse	 in	 Ibn	 al-ʽArabī,	
Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya,	 Vol.	 6,	 Ch.	 364,	
p. 47:	 fa-ʽayn al-jamʽ ʽayn al-farq fa-’nẓur /
bi-ʽaynika li-’jtimāʽ fī-l-iftirāq:	 “the	 essence





‘Uthmān]	The Kashf Al-Mahjúb: The Oldest
Persian Treatise on Sufiism by Alí B. Uthmán
Al-Jullábi Al-Hujwírí,	 trans.	 by	 Reynold	A.
Nicholson,	 London:	 Luzac,	 1976,	 pp.	 251–
260	et	passim.	On	 the	 topic	of	 ‘coincidence
of	opposites’,	see	Sara	Sviri,	“Between	Fear
and	Hope:	On	the	Coincidence	of	Opposites












questions,	I	find	help	in	another	passage	from The Meccan Revelations.
Chapter	 24	 of	The Meccan Revelations is	 not	 a	 long	 chapter,	 but	 it	 has	 a	
lengthy	title.	Here	is	the	rendering	of	its	first	part:	“The	Twenty-Fourth	Chap-
ter	Concerning	the	Knowledge	that	derives	from	the	Ontological	Sciences	(…	




sumed	under	God’s	kingship	and	ownership.	But	 the	picture	 that	 IA	paints	
in	 this	chapter	 is	not	of	a	hierarchical	 relationship;	what	 interests	him	spe-
















wajh wāḥid),	not	from	diverse	references	(min nisab mukhtalifa).”21
In	 this	 extraordinary	passage	 IA	asserts	 the	 singular	 individuality	 and	par-
ticularity	of	every	existing	thing.	Every	created	thing	is	unique.	God	does	not	
clone.	Hence,	nothing	really	merges	with	anything	to	the	point	of	losing	one’s	
































of	others;	 they	 seem,	 to	us,	 set	on	cancelling	us	 and	each	one	out.	Hence,	
to	preserve	our	identity	demands	that	we	defend	it	against	its	enemies	at	all	
cost;	ironically,	to	the	point	of	sacrificing	it.	When	we	tenaciously	cling	on	







The	 state	 of	 dynamic	 perplexity	 vis-à-vis	 the	 shifting	 faces	 of	 reality,	 and	
the	practice	of	 ‘seeing	with	 three	eyes’	derived	 from	Ibn	al-ʽArabī’s	vision	









See	 Ibn	 al-ʽArabī,	 Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya,	
Vol.	1,	Ch.	24,	p.	447.	For	further	references	
and	 elaborations	 of	 this	 saying,	 see	 Henry	
Corbin,	Creative Imagination in the Ṣūfism of 
Ibn ʽArabī,	trans.	by	Ralph	Manheim,	Prince-
ton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1981,	p.	188;	







The	 expression	 īrād al-kabīr ʽalā al-ṣaghīr,	
translated	 here	 as	 “[how]	 the	 large	 can	mo-
unt	the	small…”,	occurs	also	in	Ch.	8	of	Al-











For	 the	 “Elephant	 in	 a	 Dark	 Room”	 fable,	
see,	e.g.,	 [Jalāl	al-Dīn	Rūmī]	The Mathnawī 


















Ibn al-ʽArabījev barzakh i suvremena svjetska situacija
Sažetak
Autorica ovog rada nastoji pisati o misteriji barzakha u perspektivi Ibn al-ʽArabīja i iz njegove 
perspektive. Ibn al-ʽArabījeva perspektiva motri stvari iz tri dimenzije: dvije dimenzije pozi-
tivnog i negativnog, koje su nam bliske zbog naše svakidašnje binarne percepcije, i dodatne, 
treće dimenzije, koja ne pripada ni jednoj ni drugoj. To je dimenzija barzakha, koju možemo 
nazvati tercijarnom jer ona ujedinjuje i uključuje ove dvije poznate dimenzije. »Viđenje« treće 
dimenzije, barzakha, nije dostižno uobičajenoj binarnoj percepciji, nego je dostižno, sukladno 
Ibn al-ʽArabīju, samo onima koji posjeduju naročitu vrstu viđenja; oni su ahl	al-kashf, oni koji, 
takoreći, »vide« trima očima. Ipak, između binarnih i tercijarnih/ujedinjujućih percepcija po-
stoji sveprožimajuća veza napetosti. To je dinamična napetost koja obilježava sve stupnjeve 
postojanja, svjesno ili nesvjesno. Drugim riječima kazano: iako barzakh pripada dimenzi-
ji mističnog »trećeg«, snažno je prisutan i utjecajan posvuda. Manifestira se kao kognitivna 
funkcija koju Ibn al-ʽArabī naziva ‘imaginacijom’ (al-khayāl). Za njega je barzakh-imaginacija 
najsnažnija kognitivna funkcija u ljudskom ustrojstvu i ona ovisi o paradoksu: ona čini sve što 
koncipira »to/nije to«. Također, Bog, motren iz ove perspektive, jest »On/nije On«. Kako slijedi 
iz kognitivnog polja koje nastaje iz tercijarne-barzakh-imaginativne	perspektive, smatram da je 
taj pojam coincidentia	oppositorum (‘jedinstvo suprotnosti’, al-jamʽ	bayna	al-ḍiddayn). Konač-
no, primjenjujem uvide koji proistječu iz Ibn al-ʽArabījeve perspektive na pitanje ‘identiteta’ i 
na etičke dileme našeg suvremenog svijeta.
Ključne riječi
apofazija,	barzakh,	 binarna	percepcija,	coincidentia oppositorum,	 Ibn	 al-ʽArabī,	 imaginacija,	 para-
doks,	tercijarna	percepcija
Sara Sviri
Sehen mit drei Augen
Ibn al-ʽArabīs barzakh und die zeitgenössische Weltsituation
Zusammenfassung
Die Verfasserin dieses Beitrags macht den Versuch, über das Mysterium von barzakh in und 
aus Ibn al-ʽArabīs Perspektive zu schreiben. Ibn al-ʽArabīs Blickwinkel beobachtet die Dinge 
aus drei Dimensionen: zwei Dimensionen des Positiven und Negativen, die uns dank unserer 
alltäglichen binären Wahrnehmung vertraut sind, und darüber hinaus eine dritte Dimension, 
die weder der einen noch der anderen angehört. Dies ist die Dimension des barzakhs, die man 
tertiär nennen kann, da sie vereinigend ist und die beiden bekannten Dimensionen einbezieht. 
Das „Sehen“ der dritten Dimension des barzakhs ist nicht erreichbar für gewöhnliche binäre 
Wahrnehmung; es ist, Ibn al-ʽArabī zufolge, nur für jene realisierbar, die über eine besondere 
Art des Sehens verfügen; sie sind die ahl	al-kashf, also diejenigen, die sozusagen mit drei Augen 
„sehen“. Nichtsdestoweniger existiert zwischen den binären und den tertiären/vereinigenden 
Wahrnehmungen eine durchdringende Spannung der Verwandtschaft. Es ist eine dynamische 




terlässt. Mit anderen Worten, obzwar das barzakh zur Dimension des mysteriösen „Dritten“ 
gehört, ist es allenthalben stark präsent und einflussreich. Es manifestiert sich als kognitive 
Funktion, die Ibn al-ʽArabī „Imagination“ (al-khayāl) nennt. Für ihn ist die barzakh-Imaginati-
on die stärkste kognitive Funktion in der Struktur eines Menschen, wobei sie von einem Paradox 
abhängt: Alles, was sie konzipiert, macht sie zu einem „es/nicht es“. Aus dieser Perspektive 
ist Gott ebenfalls ein „Er/nicht Er“. Mit dem Ausgangspunkt im kognitiven Feld, das sich aus 
der tertiär-barzakh-imaginativen Perspektive herausbildet, nehme ich den Begriff coinciden-
tia	oppositorum („Zusammenfall der Gegensätze“, al-jamʽ	bayna	al-ḍiddayn) in Augenschein. 
Schließlich verwende ich die Einsichten, die aus Ibn al-ʽArabīs Perspektive hervorgehen, bei der 





Voir avec trois yeux
Le barzakh d’Ibn al-ʽArabī et la situation mondiale contemporaine
Résumé
L’auteur de ce travail entreprend d’écrire sur le mystère du barzakh, dans et à partir de la 
perspective d’Ibn al-ʽArabī. La perspective d’Ibn al-ʽArabī observe les choses sur la base de 
trois dimensions : deux dimensions, celle du positif et celle du négatif, qui nous sont proches car 
notre perception quotidienne binaire reposent sur elles, et une troisième dimension en plus, qui 
n’appartient ni à l’une ni à l’autre. C’est la dimension du barzakh, que l’on pourrait appeler 
de tertiaire car elle unit et inclut les deux dimensions qui nous sont bien connues. « Voir » la 
troisième dimension du barzakh n’est pas accessible à la perception binaire ordinaire; elle est 
accessible, selon Ibn al-ʽArabī, seulement à ceux qui possèdent une qualité particulière dans « 
le voir » : ce sont des ahl al-kashf, ceux qui, pour ainsi dire, « voient » avec trois yeux. Néan-
moins, il existe entre les perceptions binaires et tertiaires/unissantes une intime et omnipré-
sente connexion de l’ordre d’une tension dynamique qui révèle tous les niveaux de l’existence, 
conscients ou inconscients. En d’autres termes, bien que le barzakh appartienne à la dimension 
mystique du « troisième », il est est fortement présent et exerce son influence en tout lieu. Il se 
manifeste comme une fonction cognitive que Ibn al-ʽArabī nomme « imagination » (al-khayāl). 
Pour lui, l’imagination-barzakh est la plus puissante des fonctions cognitives présentes dans la 
constitution de l’Homme et repose sur un paradoxe : elle forme tout ce qui conçoit le « cela/cela 
n’est pas ». De même, Dieu, pensé à partir de cette perspective est « Lui/n’est pas Lui ». Sur la 
base du champ cognitif qui est apparu à partir de l’idée de l’imaginative-barzakh-tertiaire, je 
pense qu’il est question du concept de coincidentia	oppositorum	(« l’unité des opposés », al-jamʽ	
bayna	al-ḍiddayn). Enfin, j’applique les idées qui découlent de la perspective d’Ibn al-ʽArabī à 
la question des « identités » et aux dilemmes éthiques de notre monde contemporain.
Mots-clés
apophasie,	barzakh,	perception	binaire,	coincidentia oppositorum,	Ibn	al-ʽArabī,	imagination,	para-
doxe,	perception	tertiaire
